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• A safe and efficient financial system is important
for the development and longer-run growth of
the economy. Recent research at the Bank of
Canada has considered various aspects of
efﬁciency in Canadian ﬁnancial services,
speciﬁcally in the banking industry.
• The research summarized in this article
suggests that, overall, Canadian banks appear
to be relatively efﬁcient producers of ﬁnancial
services. As well, some efﬁciency gains from
becoming larger appear to be possible.
• The research implies as well that Canadian
banks do not exercise monopoly or collusive-
oligopoly power, and that banking can be
considered a monopolistically competitive
industry.
• However, data limitations constrain the ability
to examine these issues in great depth.
• The analysis reported here also indicates that
past legislative and regulatory changes have
beneﬁted efﬁciency in Canadian ﬁnancial
services and might have improved
contestability. This points to the importance of
continuing to promote efﬁciency and
competition in ﬁnancial services in Canada.
safe and efﬁcient ﬁnancial system is impor-
tant for the development and longer-run
growth of the economy. Indeed, a recent
comprehensive survey of the research liter-
ature suggests that the quality of ﬁnancial service pro-
vision is a key ingredient for economic growth (Dolar
and Meh 2002). Recent research at the Bank of Canada
has considered various aspects of efﬁciency in Cana-
dian ﬁnancial services, particularly in the banking
industry. In this article, we summarize the main
insights from this research.
To provide context, we begin in the next section with
a brief review of the recent history of the Canadian
banking industry, with a particular focus on the evolu-
tion of the governing legislation since 1980. Basic per-
formance measures of banking efficiency are then
considered, followed by a discussion of efﬁciency and
economies of scale based on econometric methods. We
also review a key inﬂuence on efﬁciency, the nature of
competition in Canadian banking, and then present
concluding remarks.
The Evolution of Canadian Banking
Historically, the structure of the Canadian banking
industry has been relatively stable. From 1920 to 1980,
for example, Canada consistently had 11 banks
(Bordo1995).Aswell,priorto1980,thefinancialservices
industry had been segmented (by legislation, regula-
tion, and practice) into distinct “pillars”: commercial
banking, trust business, insurance underwriting and
brokerage, and securities underwriting and dealing.
There were also constraints on the entry of foreign
banks into the Canadian market.
In the past 25 years, with changes in market practice
and a series of revisions to the governing ﬁnancial leg-
islation, there has been a signiﬁcant evolution of the
Canadian banking industry. Key characteristics have
Efﬁciency and Competition in
Canadian Banking
Jason Allen and Walter Engert,* Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis
A
* The authors thank Bob Amano, Greg Caldwell, Allan Crawford, Richard
Dion, Pierre Duguay, Clyde Goodlet, Sharon Kozicki, Luc Laeven, Dinah
Maclean, John C. Panzar, Jack Selody, and Sherrill Shaffer for their helpful
advice and comments.34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
been the entry of foreign banks and the expansion of
banks into the range of ﬁnancial services, including
the trust business, insurance underwriting and sales
(although not through bank branches), and securities
underwriting and dealing.1
There has been a substantial
evolution of the Canadian banking
system over the past 25 years,
including numerous changes
that have affected the powers,
organization, and competitive
pressures in the industry.
A feature of all federal legislation concerning ﬁnancial
institutions,includingtheBankAct,isasunsetprovision
that requires a periodic review of the policy frame-
work and legislation that govern ﬁnancial services.
This formal review process led to important legisla-
tive amendments in 1980, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002
that have contributed to the development of more
diversified and more market-oriented activities on
the part of Canadian banks. In addition, important
changes to the legislation regarding the entry of foreign
banks into Canada were made in 1980 and 1999.
Specifically, the 1980 Bank Act revisions allowed banks
to establish subsidiaries in various ﬁnancial services
markets, such as venture capital and mortgage lending.
The mortgage-loan subsidiaries could raise deposits
that were exempt from reserve requirements (which
existed at the time). As a result, the banks could com-
pete more effectively in the mortgage-lending market
withtrustcompanies,whosedepositswerenotsubject
to reserve requirements. As well, foreign banks were
allowed to establish bank subsidiaries in Canada.
Before this revision, the possibility of foreign bank
entry had been curtailed by amendments to the Bank
Act in 1967. Nevertheless, from 1967 to 1980, foreign
banks operated in Canada on a limited scale through
non-bank afﬁliates that issued commercial paper in
Canada carrying their parent bank’s guarantee, thereby
1.  For discussions of these and related developments in Canada, see Daniel,
Freedman, and Goodlet (1993); Freedman (1998); and Engert et al. (1999).
funding their activities in sales and business ﬁnance.2
Following the 1980 Bank Act revision, all such affiliates
were to be incorporated as subsidiaries, subject to the
provisions of the Bank Act, and able to conduct the full
range of banking activities. This legislative change led
to many foreign bank subsidiaries opening in Canada,
with the number peaking at around 50 in the mid-1980s.
In 1987, Canadian banks (both domestic and foreign)
were permitted to invest in corporate securities dealers,
as well as distribute government bonds. All major
banks subsequently made substantial investments in
the securities business and purchased control of most
of the existing investment dealers. The 1987 amend-
ments also allowed financial intermediaries to conduct
brokerage activities. Following legislative revisions in
1992, Canadian banks were allowed to enter the trust
business through the establishment or acquisition of
trust companies. Most trust companies were subse-
quently purchased by Canada’s largest banks. In this
regard, the ﬁnancial difﬁculties that many trust com-
panies experienced following the collapse of the spec-
ulative real estate boom in the late 1980s contributed
to the ability of the banks to acquire them. In 1997,
new legislation included various changes to update
and revise the amendments made in 1992.
In 1999 (pursuant to provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement), foreign banks were allowed to
directly establish branches in Canada, without having
to establish a subsidiary. However, foreign bank branches
were restricted to wholesale activities; that is, deposits
made at such branches must have a minimum value of
$150,000.3 By the end of 2006, in addition to 22 domes-
tic banks there were 50 foreign banks operating in
Canada, including 26 foreign bank subsidiaries and
24 foreign bank branches. Finally, legislative changes
in 2002 provided for modest increases in the range
of business powers available to Canadian banks; for
example, they were allowed to own ﬁnance compa-
nies. As well, there was a moderate decrease of the
2. According to MacIntosh (1984), by the time of the 1980 Bank Act revisions,
there were about 60 foreign banks represented in Canada, including some
with several ofﬁces.
3.  There were concerns among policy-makers that unrestricted entry of
foreign bank branches at the retail level could create risks for the Canada
Deposit Insurance Corporation and for the Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions that would be difﬁcult for these agencies to manage,
given the foreign control and supervision of such branches. As a result,
foreign bank branches were allowed to take only deposits signiﬁcantly above
the deposit insurance coverage limit.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
Box 1: Canadian and U.S. Banks
To investigate efficiency and economies of scale,
Allen, Engert, and Liu (2006) considered a sample that
includes the six major Canadian banks, which com-
prise over 90 per cent of the assets of the Canadian
banking sector. The banks are Royal Bank Financial
Group, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, TD Bank Financial Group, Bank of Nova
Scotia, and National Bank. The efﬁciency comparisons
reported consider total U.S. banks and a sample of
12 U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs).
The BHCs are selected from the top 20 U.S. banks in
terms of assets as of 31 December 2004. They were
selected because there are continuous data from 1986
to 2004, and because most of these banks have a busi-
ness mix broadly similar to that of the Canadian
banks, benchmarked in a specific manner. That is,
most of these BHCs make a similar proportion of rev-
enue from retail banking. The BHCs are JPMorgan
Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Wachovia Corp.,
Wells Fargo & Co., U.S. Bancorp, SunTrust Banks Inc.,
National City Corp., Citizens Financial Group Inc.,
BB&T Corp., Fifth Third Bancorp, Keycorp, and The
PNC Financial Services Group Inc.
With regard to the research on contestability in Allen
and Liu (forthcoming), 10 domestic banks and 15
foreign banks operating in Canada were considered.
The 10 domestic banks are Royal Bank Financial
Group, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, TD Bank Financial Group, Bank of Nova
Scotia, National Bank, Canadian Western Bank,
Laurentian Bank, Citizens Bank of Canada and Manu-
Life Bank. The 15 foreign banks operating in Canada
that are included in the study are Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Sumitomo
Mitsui Banking Corporation, HSBC Bank of Canada,
JP Morgan Chase Bank, ING Bank, Bank of China,
Bank of East Asia, BCPBank Canada, BNP Paribas,
CTC bank of Canada, International Commercial Bank
of Cathay, MBNA Canada, National Bank of Greece,
and ABN Amro Bank.
ately, in part to avoid becoming subject to supervisory
intervention.
Performance Measures
Clearly, there has been a substantial evolution of the
Canadian banking system over the past 25 years,
including numerous changes that have affected the
powers, organization, and competitive pressures in
the industry. In this section, we begin our examination
of efficiency in Canadian banking by considering some
basic performance measures. As a frame of reference,
the performance measures for Canadian banks are
compared with samples of U.S. banks.
More speciﬁcally, based on work by Allen, Engert, and
Liu (2006), we report simple performance measures
for the six largest Canadian banks (which account for
the great majority of Canadian banking assets), total
U.S. commercial banks, and a subset of U.S. bank
holding companies (BHCs). (See Box 1 for more on
these banks.) The data used in this study are from the
balance sheets and income statements reported by
these institutions to the banking supervisors in Canada
and the United States. To make the data comparable,
all variables are deﬂated by the consumer price index
restrictions that preclude concentrated holdings of
bank equity.
In addition to the various changes that have affected
the powers, organization, and barriers to entry in
banking, the regulatory regime was also fundamen-
tally reformed during this period, through a series of
changes to the incentives and powers of the regime
(Engert 2005). The key measures were:
• the establishment of a clear mandate for
the supervisor, focused on protecting the
interests of depositors and other creditors,
and which recognizes that ﬁnancial institu-
tions can fail;
• the creation of the authority and obligation
for the supervisor to act promptly and pre-
emptively with regard to troubled institu-
tions; and
• the establishment of the authority and
means for other safety-net agencies (notably
theCanadaDepositInsuranceCorporation)
to inﬂuence the supervisory process.
In turn, these changes have inﬂuenced the environ-
ment in which ﬁnancial institutions operate and have
sharpened their incentives to manage risk appropri-36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
(CPI) excluding food and energy prices, in their res-
pective countries. As well, the data are converted to a
common currency using a Canada/U.S. dollar exchange
rate that reflects the relative purchasing power of
these currencies in the ﬁnancial services sector of the
two countries.4
Expense ratio
The expense ratio, which is deﬁned as the ratio of non-
interest expense to net operating revenue (net interest
income plus non-interest income), is often used by
analysts to evaluate bank performance.5 Chart 1
presents the expense ratio for Canadian banks, a sam-
ple of U.S. BHCs, and total U.S. banks. The expense
ratio of Canadian banks was lower than that of U.S.
banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This measure,
however, has been trending up at the Canadian banks
and down at the U.S. banks over the sample period, so
that the expense ratio of Canadian banks currently
exceeds that of U.S. banks.
Allen, Engert, and Liu’s (2006) analysis indicates that
the difference in the expense ratios between the Cana-
dian and U.S. banks can currently be attributed to
higher overall labour costs (wages and beneﬁts) at the
Canadian banks compared with the U.S. banks in their
samples.
Labour productivity ratio
The authors also examine measures that consider the
output produced by banks, relative to labour input.
Bank output is difﬁcult to measure, however, on both
conceptual and pragmatic grounds. Indeed, it is widely
believed that ofﬁcial (national accounts) statistics on
output and productivity in ﬁnancial services indus-
tries are subject to large errors. Maclean (1996, 1997),
for example, concludes that productivity growth in
ﬁnancial services as measured in Canadian ofﬁcial sta-
tistics is probably signiﬁcantly underestimated (see
4. Rao, Tang, and Wang (2004) suggest, after detailed calculations, a purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) exchange rate of 1.09 for ﬁnancial services (in 1999),
which is used here.
5.  The denominator of this ratio—particularly net interest income—depends
on the risk differential between assets and liabilities. A change in the expense
ratio can therefore be caused by changes in risk taking and not necessarily by
changed efﬁciency. A change in the mix of a bank’s services or products (say,
towards non-traditional banking services) can also affect this ratio by altering
the mix of inputs and expenses. Thus, we prefer the term “expense ratio” to
“efﬁciency ratio,” as it is sometimes called.
also Triplett and Bosworth 2004 or Diewert 2005).6 As
noted above, the analysis in Allen, Engert, and Liu
(2006) does not rely on national accounts data; their
data are from balance sheets and income statements
reported to bank supervisors.
Another important consideration concerns the price
index used to deflate nominal output to produce a
measure of “real output.” To most accurately measure
real output in banking, nominal variables should be
deﬂated by a price index that speciﬁcally measures the
prices of banking services, instead of a more general
price index, like the GDP deﬂator or the CPI. Use of a
more general price index could be misleading if there
was a substantial difference between the evolution of
prices in ﬁnancial services and prices more generally.
However, no bank-speciﬁc price measures exist for
Canada, so Allen, Engert, and Liu (2006) use the CPI
excluding food and energy prices to deﬂate nominal
output measures (total assets and net operating
income).7
6.  The difﬁculty in measuring service industries (such as ﬁnance and health
care) is a longstanding problem for the statistical systems in most countries.
To address this problem, Statistics Canada is putting into place a program to
improve the measurement of outputs and prices in service industries in Can-
ada, including ﬁnancial services.
7.  Consequently, the resulting measures could arguably be considered meas-













1986 1991 1996 2001
Total U.S. banks
Canadian banks
U.S. BHCs37 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
Chart 2 compares total assets per full-time equivalent
employee of Canadian banks, the U.S. BHCs, and total
U.S. banks. By this measure, the productivity of Cana-
dian banks has been considerably higher than that of
U.S. banks in the past decade.8 As is the case when
using the expense ratio as a measure of efﬁciency,
there are challenges inherent in using assets per
employee as a measure of productivity. The decision
of banks to have loans, for example, on-balance sheet
or off-balance sheet (via securitization), is a response
to historical, institutional, and regulatory differences
across countries. (Freedman and Engert 2003 discuss
different patterns of securitization in Canadian and
U.S. banking, and reasons for these differences.) It is
therefore possible that banks use different approaches
to generate similar proﬁts.
Given these factors, the authors consider a measure
that internalizes differences in asset generation, dispo-
sition, and management, and focuses on overall results.
Speciﬁcally, Chart 3 shows net operating revenue per
full-time equivalent employee of Canadian banks, the
U.S. BHCs, and total U.S. banks. According to this
measure, Canadian bank employees were less produc-
tive than their U.S. counterparts in the late 1980s, but
started to catch up in the early 1990s. In fact, according
to this measure, the three groups of banks have con-
verged since the late 1990s.
8. Including in total assets an approximation of non-traditional activities (dis-





















Cost Inefﬁciency and Economies of
Scale
In this section, we discuss results from recent Bank of
Canada research that considers another means of
gauging bank efﬁciency, based on econometric meth-
ods, using disaggregated bank data (Allen and Liu
2005; Allen, Engert, and Liu 2006). Speciﬁcally, we
examine how efﬁciently banks transform inputs into
outputs and consider returns to scale in Canadian
banking. The analytical framework uses a standard
tool in the research literature on such questions (the
translog cost function).
Methodology
In this framework, researchers study how efﬁciently
inputs are transformed into the ﬁnancial services that
a bank sells to consumers. To do so, a model that relates
costs to measures of bank output and input prices is
estimated. The analysis also takes account of techno-
logical progress and the effects of regulatory changes.
In addition, the model incorporates variables to measure
unique inﬂuences on cost structures speciﬁc to each
bank in the sample. Essentially, the idea is to estimate
the empirical relationship between costs and the
ﬁnancial services that a bank produces, while recog-
nizing the impact of technological change and the
inﬂuence of the regulatory environment.
Chart 3
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Inferences regarding economies of scale are drawn
from observing how the banks’ estimated cost struc-
tures vary with the scale of output. The efﬁciency with
which inputs are transformed into outputs is measured
through terms in the model that capture residual,
unexplained inﬂuences on the cost structures of the
banks. Since the model accounts for identiﬁable inﬂu-
ences on the cost structure of a bank, any unexplained
inﬂuences on costs are considered to be the result of
inefﬁciency or waste, and so form the basis for the
measure of “cost inefficiency”—which is our focus
here.
In this framework, the most efficient bank is considered
to be the bank with the lowest inefﬁciency measure,
and is also taken to represent the best-practice or
benchmark institution, that is, the efﬁcient frontier in
that banking system. Then each bank’s distance from
that efficient frontier is measured. An efficient banking
system overall, according to this measure, is repre-
sented by relatively small inefﬁciency measures.
Data
The model includes the costs of labour, capital, and
deposits, measured respectively as: the average hourly
wage of bank employees; expenses on real estate and
ﬁxtures as well as information and communication
technology plus related costs; and the effective interest
rate paid on deposits.
Bank output is divided into ﬁve categories: consumer
loans, mortgage loans, non-mortgage loans, other
financial assets on the balance sheet, and an asset-
equivalent measure of non-traditional activities. The
latter is aimed at capturing the growing importance of
activities such as wealth management and securities
trading.
To measure these activities, the authors use the asset-
equivalent approach introduced by Boyd and Gertler
(1994). This adjustment assumes that non-traditional
activities yield the same rate of return on assets (ROA)
as traditional activities, and so the assets that are
required to produce non-interest income can be calcu-
lated by dividing non-interest income by the ROA of
traditional activities. Allen, Engert, andLiu (2006) also
consider the effects of increasing the assumed return
on off-balance-sheet activities by 5 to 10 percentage
points; the impact on the results reported below is
marginal.
The model is estimated using quarterly data from
1983 through 2004 for the Canadian banks, and from
1986 through 2004 for the U.S. BHCs (discussed in
Box 1). Separate models are estimated for the Cana-
dian and U.S. banking industries, given the differ-
ences in the development of the institutional and
regulatory environments in Canada and the United
States.
Results
For the Canadian banks, the analysis suggests that
there are increasing returns to scale of about 6 per cent,
suggesting that the Canadian banks could gain
(modestly) from being larger. As regards the measure
of cost inefﬁciency for Canadian banks, this research
ﬁnds that the gap between the efﬁcient frontier (the
best-practice bank) and other banks averages less than
10 per cent, depending on the model speciﬁcation con-
sidered.Morerefinedmeasuresoftechnologicalchange
inthemodel(capturinginvestmentinemployeetraining
and automated banking machines, for example) lead
to estimates of cost inefficiency among Canadian banks
averaging about 6.5 per cent. As well, the results indi-
cate that Canadian banks have tended to move closer
to the efﬁcient frontier over time.
For the U.S. case, increasing returns to scale are also
found, but, at about 2 per cent, these are considerably
smaller than in the Canadian sample. Estimates of cost
inefﬁciency for the sample of U.S. banks indicate that
the average gap between the efficient frontier and other
banks is greater than 10 per cent, which is a typical
result in the research literature on U.S. bank efﬁciency
(for example, Berger and Mester 1997). In the model
that best ﬁts the data in Allen, Engert, and Liu (2006),
the average measure of cost inefﬁciency for U.S. BHCs
is about 14 per cent. As well, cost inefﬁciency among
the U.S. BHCs has not narrowed appreciably over the
sample period.
A striking feature of the results is
that the measure of cost inefﬁciency
for Canadian banks is comparatively
low, suggesting that Canadian banks
are relatively efﬁcient according
to this measure.
In various studies of bank efﬁciency in different coun-
tries, inefficiency measures similar to those found
by Allen, Engert, and Liu for the U.S. case are not39 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
unusual (see Berger and Humphrey 1997, for exam-
ple.) That is, cost-inefﬁciency measures in excess of 10
per cent, as found for the U.S. case, seem to be typical
of other countries as well. However, a striking feature
of Allen, Engert, and Liu’s results is that the measure
of cost inefﬁciency for Canadian banks is compara-
tively low, suggesting that Canadian banks are rela-
tively efﬁcient according to this measure.
Notably, the authors also find that technological
progress and legislative changes have reduced the
cost structures of banks in both Canada and the
United States. For example, in Canada, the revisions
to the ﬁnancial legislation in 1987 and 1997 appear to
have been particularly beneﬁcial in reducing the cost
structures of Canadian banks.
Competition in Canadian Banking
An important dimension to consider when evaluating
efﬁciency is competition. In this regard, other things
being equal, a more competitive environment is gen-
erally expected to lead to more efficient outcomes.
In this section, we report recent research by Bank of
Canada staff (Allen and Liu forthcoming) that considers
the state of competition in Canadian banking.
Concentration, competition, and
contestability
Canada has a highly concentrated banking market; for
example, the largest six banks account for more than
90 per cent of the assets in the banking system. Formal
measures of concentration in banking (such as the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index) are typically in a range
that points to what economists would interpret as a
medium or high degree of market concentration.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that such
assessments neglect the competition (especially in
retail and small-business banking) provided by credit
unions and caisses populaires, of which there are about
1,000 in Canada, and which are particularly promi-
nent in certain regions of the country, such as British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and parts of the
Atlantic provinces. Insurance companies are another
source of competition in ﬁnancial services; indeed, the
major life insurance companies rank among the very
largest ﬁnancial services ﬁrms in Canada.
Traditionally, it has been believed that a more concen-
trated industry is less competitive, and liable to com-
promise economic efficiency. However, empirical
research on this idea provides mixed results. For exam-
ple, a study by Bikker and Haaf (2002) on 23 European
countries found support for the traditional view that
concentration impairs competition. In contrast, a more
recent study by Claessens and Laeven (2005), using a
data set of almost 4,000 banks from 50 countries, con-
cludes that competition is not negatively related to
concentration. These authors ﬁnd that greater compe-
tition in ﬁnancial services is most clearly related to an
absence of barriers to entry (including with regard
to foreign bank entry), and a policy framework that
places few restrictions on the activities of ﬁnancial
services ﬁrms.
The latter paper points to the notion of “contestability,”
which refers to the ability of ﬁrms to enter a market
and compete with incumbents. Speciﬁcally, a market
is considered to be contestable if barriers to entry are
not prohibitive and if ﬁrms can exit from the industry
without enduring punitive costs, so that ﬁrms are not
discouraged from entering in the ﬁrst place. The key
idea is that a ﬁrm may be compelled to be more com-
petitive and efﬁcient by the prospect of new entrants.
As a result, instead of considering only simple concen-
tration measures to assess the degree of competition in
an industry, economists tend to focus more on measures
of market conduct to gauge the degree of contestability
in an industry.9
Recent research by Bank staff (Allen and Liu forth-
coming) measures contestability in the Canadian
banking industry. This line of research, following the
seminal work of Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar
and Rosse (1982, 1987), focuses on testing statistically
for three forms of market structure: monopoly or col-
lusive oligopoly on the one hand; perfect competition
on the other; and an intermediate market structure,
called monopolistic competition.
The specific test relies on basic propositions of eco-
nomic theory and involves measuring the effect on
firm revenue of an increase in input costs.10 For
instance, if the costs of a monopolist or collusive-
oligopolist ﬁrm increase, it will raise its price and,
given market conditions that exist in a monopoly
setting, the revenue of the ﬁrm will fall. On the other
9. For a comprehensive discussion of the measurement of ﬁrm conduct in dif-
ferent market structures, see Bresnahan (1989). Northcott (2004) provides a
recent review of the research literature on competition in banking.
10.  This test relies on the fact that a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist always
operates at an elastic point on its market demand curve, whereas a competi-
tive group of ﬁrms need not (Shaffer 1982).40 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
hand, if the costs of ﬁrms operating in perfect compe-
tition rise, there will be an equivalent proportional
increase in its prices, and given relevant market condi-
tions, its revenue will increase in a one-for-one fashion.
If the firm was operating in an environment of
monopolistic competition, its price response to an
industry-wide cost increase would lie between these
preceding cases, as would the effect on its revenues.
Speciﬁcally, the effect of a cost increase on ﬁrm reve-
nues would be positive, but less than a one-for-one
increase.
Measuring contestability: The H-statistic
The method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987)
allows researchers to estimate the nature of the com-
petitive behaviour of ﬁrms based on the properties of
(reduced-form) revenue equations. Speciﬁcally, this
methodology allows one to estimate a statistic, called
the H-statistic, that measures the extent to which the
revenues of a ﬁrm change in response to a change in
input prices. Put differently, the H-statistic is the sum
of the elasticities of the revenue of a ﬁrm with respect
to changes in input prices.11
Consistent with the preceding discussion, the
H-statistic equals 1 if the market can be characterized
by perfect competition; that is, in this case, revenues
respond in a one-for-one manner to input-price changes.
Most importantly, the H-statistic is less than 0 if the
underlying market structure is a monopoly or a col-
lusive oligopoly; that is, revenues respond nega-
tively to cost changes. Notably, an H-statistic in this
11.  Given that there is incomplete information on prices and quantities of
inputs and outputs in banking, one of the main advantages of the Panzar-
Rosse methodology is its relatively modest data requirement. At the same
time, this implies a partial-equilibrium analysis, where the industry demand
curve, in effect, is ﬁxed. The empirical signiﬁcance of this simpliﬁcation does
not appear to have been explored in the research literature. The scarcity of
data also means that it is very difficult to conduct a general-equilibrium analysis
of competition.
Box 2: What Is Monopolistic Competition?
Monopolistic competition describes an industry struc-
ture combining elements of both monopoly and per-
fect competition. Similar to perfect competition, there
are a number of sellers, and conditions of entry and
exit are not prohibitive. In a monopolistically compet-
itive industry, however, products are somewhat dif-
ferentiated, and ﬁrms invest heavily in establishing
intangibles such as brand recognition and loyalty, for
example.
Each ﬁrm in a monopolistically competitive industry
has some degree of market power over the prices of
the goods and services that it sells. The degree of mar-
ket power is related to certain factors, including, for
example, the extent of barriers to entry into the indus-
try and the extent of successful product differentiation
(and brand loyalty) created by the ﬁrm. However,
although the products of a monopolistically competi-
tive ﬁrm are differentiated somehow from those of its
competitors, there are substitutes for those products
so that the demand for the firm’s products will depend
on the prices charged by rivals producing similar (but
also somewhat differentiated) products.
Monopolistic competition is probably the most preva-
lent market structure in modern economies. Consider
the markets for many consumer goods, for example,
such as breakfast cereals, beer, fast food, toothpaste, or
sports shoes, among others. Each is characterized by a
handful of dominant ﬁrms offering differentiated (but
similar) products aiming to establish a brand, and
there is considerable investment by the ﬁrms in those
industries to create brand recognition and loyalty
(through advertising, for instance). As well, arguably
the most prominent class of macroeconomic models
used by economists today (so-called New Keynesian
models) features monopolistic competition to charac-
terize ﬁrm behaviour. Indeed, ﬁrm behaviour in the
Bank of Canada’s primary monetary policy model is
monopolistic competition.
From a theoretical perspective, it can be shown that
monopolistic competition is less efficient than the ideal
of perfect competition. This inefﬁciency is essentially
the result of producing and promoting a (possibly
excessive) variety of products. However, because a
number of ﬁrms are competing and both entry and
exit are possible in this form of market structure (con-
testability), monopolistic competition is not generally
considered to be a problem from the perspective of
competition policy.41 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
range would suggest ﬁrm behaviour injurious to con-
sumer welfare. Finally, the H-statistic ranges between
0 and 1 for other intermediate forms of market struc-
ture, which are broadly characterized as monopolistic
competition. (See Box 2 for more on monopolistic com-
petition.)
Many researchers have applied this methodology to
study competition in the ﬁnancial sector, speciﬁcally
banking, in numerous countries. The main idea is to
test statistically for evidence of monopoly or collusive-
oligopoly behaviour (an H-statistic less than 0). An
early application of the methodology to the Canadian
ﬁnancial system is Nathan and Neave (1989), which
studies competition in banking in the early 1980s.
Shaffer (1993) uses a variation of the H-statistic to
study competition among Canadian banks from 1965
to 1989. The H-statistic methodology has also been
applied widely to other countries. For example,
Molyneux, Altunbas and Gardener (1996) ﬁnd evi-
dence of collusive-oligopoly behaviour in the Japanese
banking sector in 1986–88. Using a sample from 1987
to 1994, Rime (1999) concludes that monopolistic com-
petition characterized the Swiss banking system.
Examples of large cross-country studies are Bikker
and Groeneveld (2002) and Claessens and Laeven
(2004, 2005).
Empirical studies of banking generally do not ﬁnd
perfect competition nor monopoly or collusive-
oligopoly behaviour, and instead ﬁnd evidence of
monopolistic competition in the banking systems
of most countries. The research literature generally
concludes that the Canadian banking system can be
reliably considered to be a case of monopolistic com-
petition and suggests that it ranks among the most
contestable in the world.
While these cross-country studies yield interesting
results, they should be interpreted with caution, for a
few reasons. First, the H-statistic relies on the assump-
tion that markets are in equilibrium (which can be
tested, and often is in empirical work, including that
by Bank of Canada staff reported here). By comparing
the H-statistic across countries, these studies implic-
itly assume that the banking systems in these coun-
tries are consistently in equilibrium during the sample
period. Second, it might be the case that environmen-
tal conditions (such as regulatory treatment) vary sig-
niﬁcantly across countries, which can complicate
cross-country comparisons. Third, the research litera-
ture has not agreed on a robust way of mapping the
H-statistic into speciﬁc inferences about competitive
conduct for all ranges of the statistic, particularly
when H is between 0 and 1. As a result, linear inter-
pretations of the H-statistic may be problematic. Sim-
ply put, it may not be meaningful to rank-order
similar H-statistics across countries or different sam-
ple periods to compare degrees of contestability when
H lies between 0 and 1 (which is often done).
Finally, a recent working paper, Bikker, Spierdijk, and
Finnie (2006), has raised doubts regarding some previ-
ous estimates of contestability. These authors suggest
that many empirical studies using the H-statistic to
measure contestability in banking over-estimate the
level of banking competition because of a systematic
misapplication of the method.12 In the work con-
ducted by Bank of Canada staff reported here, both
the traditional application of the method and the
approach recently recommended by Bikker, Spierdijk,
and Finnie (2006) are considered.
Methodology
To calculate the H-statistic for Canadian banks, Allen
and Liu (forthcoming) estimate a model that relates
the revenues from banking outputs to the costs of
banking inputs. Banks are considered to produce one
composite output, which consists of loans and other
investments, as well as non-traditional sources of rev-
enue. As noted by Allen and Liu (2005), in the past
decade, banks have been generating a larger share of
their income from non-traditional sources (such as
depositor services, wealth management, underwriting,
and foreign exchange trading). Indeed, in the past ﬁve
years, income from such sources has typically surpassed
that from traditional banking activities. Accordingly,
these authors take account of such non-traditional rev-
enue sources in their calculations, following the asset-
equivalent approach described above.
The model includes expenses on salaries, pensions, and
employee beneﬁts, as well as expenses on premises,
computers, and equipment; the cost of deposits; and
a series of bank-specific factors that reflect various
behavioural and risk considerations (for details, see
Allen and Liu forthcoming).
12.  This has to do with how variables are represented in the estimated equa-
tions; for a discussion, see Allen and Liu (forthcoming). Brieﬂy put, the stand-
ard approach followed in many econometric studies to control for bank size
using total assets transforms the revenue equation into a price equation, and
therefore, the elasticities are with reference to price, and not revenue, as they
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Data
The data are quarterly observations for 10 domestic
and 15 foreign banks operating in Canada from 2000
to 2006. The number of banks in this study is con-
strained by data availability. (See Box 1 for more on
the banks considered in this study.) The data set is
from the banks’ consolidated monthly balance sheet
and quarterly consolidated statement of income, col-
lected by the Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions. Because the research focuses on the
domestic market, the authors limit inclusion of varia-
bles to those booked in Canada. (All data are deﬂated
by the GDP deﬂator.) The assets of the banks in this
sample account for 98 per cent of the total Canadian-
dollar assets of the banking sector.
Results
When Allen and Liu (forthcoming) estimate the H-
statistic measure of contestability in the conventional
manner, they obtain results very similar to those for
Canada in previous studies, such as Claessens and
Laeven (2004) for 1994–2001, Claessens and Laeven
(2005) for 1987–96, and Nathan and Neave (1989) for
1983 and 1984. All of these studies conclude that
Canada’s banking system is characterized by monop-
olistic competition. Similarly, Shaffer (1993) concludes
that there was no monopoly or collusive-oligopoly
market power in Canadian banking from 1965–89.
Results from various studies relevant to Canada are
summarized in Table 1.
The overall conclusion is
that Canadian banks do not
exercise monopoly or
collusive-oligopoly power.
When the H-statistic methodology is adjusted as sug-
gested by Bikker, Spierdijk, and Finnie (2006), Allen
and Liu ﬁnd quantitatively smaller estimates of con-
testability, as expected. However, the overall conclu-
sion remains that Canadian banks do not exercise
monopoly or collusive-oligopoly power. (For com-
plete results for various hypothesis tests, see Allen
and Liu forthcoming.)
It is interesting that the Allen and Liu study, which
focuses on the latest time period, and uses more
detailed data as well as more-reﬁned model speciﬁca-
tions than previous work, produces H-statistics that
lead to the same conclusions as earlier studies. Also,
the Canadian ﬁnancial sector has experienced signiﬁ-
cant legislative and regulatory change, as well as sub-
stantial consolidation, including the acquisition by
banksofmortgageandloancompanies,trustcompanies,
and other ﬁnancial service providers. At the same
time, there has been substantial new entry by foreign
Table 1
Measures of Contestability in Canadian Banking
Study H-statistic Period Sample Conclusion
Nathan and 1.06 1982 all banks perfectcompe-
Neave (1989) tition
0.68 1983 all banks monopolistic
competition
0.73 1984 all banks monopolistic
competition
Shaffer (1993) not reported 1965– all banks no monopoly
89 power
Bikker and 0.60 1991 all banks monopolistic
Haaf (2002) competition
0.62 1997 all banks monopolistic
competition
0.74 1991 small banks monopolistic
competition
0.63 1991 medium-sized monopolistic
banks competition
0.56 1991 large banks monopolistic
competition
0.60 1997 large banks monopolistic
competition
Claessens and 0.67 1994– all banks monopolistic
Laeven (2004) 2001 competition
0.67 1987– all banks monopolistic
2001 competition
0.67 1992– all banks monopolistic
96 competition
Bikker, Spierdijk, -0.001a 1987– all banks not applicablea
and Finnie (2006) 2004
Allen and Liu 0.67 2000– 25 major monopolistic
(forthcoming) 2006 banks competition
0.35b 2000– 25 major monopolistic
2006 banks competition
a.  The authors dismiss their results for Canada as meaningless, because their
tests indicate that the banking system was not in equilibrium during their
sample period.
b.  This estimate is based on the methodology proposed by Bikker, Spierdijk,
and Finnie (2006); see text for a brief elaboration.43 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2007
banks. The empirical results suggest that regardless of
the substantial structural changes that took place in
the past 25 years, Canadian banks have behaved con-
sistently in a monopolistically competitive fashion
over this period.
There seem to be a couple of possible explanations for
this consistency. Considering that the H-statistic appears
to be robust to measurement errors (Genesove and
Mullin 1998), and given the wide range of estimates
that imply monopolistic competition (between 0 and
1), rejecting this conclusion might be difﬁcult from a
statistical perspective. At the same time, the reductions
of barriers to entry and activity restrictions that ac-
companied the legislative reforms of the past 25 years
might have increased contestability of the market, and
thereby countered possible anti-competitive effects
associated with the consolidation across financial
services over the same period.
Finally, while Allen and Liu (forthcoming) consider
alternative definitions of banking output and prices
to take into account the diversiﬁed business mix of
Canadian banks, the framework used allows for only
a single composite output. It is possible that cost struc-
tures and pricing strategies (as well as market power)
differ between the various business lines of a diversi-
fied bank. As a result, it would be better to estimate
an H-statistic for each business line. However, this
requires detailed data for each business line, which,
unfortunately, does not exist.
Conclusions
The research summarized here suggests that, overall,
Canadian banks appear to be relatively efﬁcient pro-
ducers of ﬁnancial services. As well, some efﬁciency
gains from becoming larger appear to be possible. The
research also indicates that Canadian banks do not
exercise monopoly or collusive-oligopoly power, and
that banking can be considered to be a monopolisti-
cally competitive industry.
However in the course of conducting the work reported
in this article, it has become clear that a constraint on
moreprecisestudyoftheissuesconsideredis a shortage
of relevant, detailed data.
This experience indicates the
importance of continuing to promote
efﬁciency and competition in
ﬁnancial services in Canada.
Asnotedabove,pastlegislativeandregulatorychanges
havebenefitedefficiencyinCanadianfinancialservices,
and might have improved contestability as well.
Looking forward, this experience (as well as economic
reasoning) indicates the importance of continuing to
promote efﬁciency and competition in ﬁnancial serv-
ices in Canada.
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